New Danish edition of Sadie the Air Mail Pilot from Forlaget Arvids.
Cover lettering based on Ludlow Tempo Heavy Inline.
Buy it here!
Showing posts with label aviation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label aviation. Show all posts
Sunday, 28 October 2018
Sofie den modige pilot
New Danish edition of Sadie the Air Mail Pilot from Forlaget Arvids.
Cover lettering based on Ludlow Tempo Heavy Inline.
Buy it here!
Saturday, 25 April 2015
Why we support a No-Fly Zone
Cross-posted from Syria Solidarity UK.
Read more: A manifesto for Syria
Join us in London on the 26th of April to answer the call from Syria.
Read more: A manifesto for Syria
Join us in London on the 26th of April to answer the call from Syria.
Tuesday, 24 March 2015
Washington DC Friday: Rally to Stop the Bombs in Syria
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
This Friday 27 March, 1-2pm at the White House.
From the Facebook event page:
Please join if you can.
This Friday 27 March, 1-2pm at the White House.
From the Facebook event page:
Join us as we stage a protest to demand the United States take action to stop the Syrian regime dropping barrel bombs and chemical weapons on civilians.
Come and add your voice to the voices of Syrian volunteer rescue workers - the White Helmets, thousands of non-violent activists in Syria and nearly 600,000 people around the world who are calling for a no fly zone.
On the 16th March the Syrian regime dropped barrels of chlorine on civilians in Sarmeen, Idlib killing six and injuring dozens.
The attack came just 11 days after the UN Security Council voted on a resolution saying it would take further measures, including the possibility of military force, if chlorine gas was used again in Syria. Now it has been used. The Syrian regime is testing us – if the international community doesn't take action, if our leaders break their word, it will be a green light for thousands more to be killed using poison gas and barrel bombs.
The attack also comes 390 days after the UN Security Council passed a resolution banning the use of barrel bombs. Despite these threats, the Syrian regime is doing nothing to ease its attacks on civilians. Barrel bombs have killed nearly 2000 children.
Every barrel bomb Assad drops also strengthens ISIS. Any support these extremists have in Syria is directly linked to the mass human rights violations of the Assad regime. If we want to defeat ISIS we have to end the violence in Syria.
Stand with the Syrian people because no one is free until we’re all free.
Please join if you can.
A call from Planet Syria: Is anybody out there?
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
Planet Syria is an initiative by non-violent Syrian activists. They write:
Scroll down on their website, www.planetsyria.org, to read more:
You’ll also find Planet Syria on Facebook and Twitter.
Planet Syria is an initiative by non-violent Syrian activists. They write:
Non-violent activists across Syria are calling for global solidarity around their joint demands of stopping the regime's barrel bombs and pushing for inclusive peace talks.
Scroll down on their website, www.planetsyria.org, to read more:
STOP THE BOMBS
Extremism breeds from injustice – the biggest killer of civilians in Syria today is the ‘barrel bomb’. These are often old oil barrels filled with explosive and scrap metal and rolled out of government helicopters and planes miles up in the air onto hospitals, schools and homes.
The UN Security Council unanimously banned them a year ago. Nothing has changed since then – nearly 2,000 children have been killed since UN Resolution 2139 was signed on February 22, 2014.
Many of us were against foreign military intervention in Syria. But in September 2014 the US-led coalition started bombing ISIS in our country. Now there is a deep hypocrisy to letting the Assad regime fly in the same airspace and kill civilians. Many more than are killed by ISIS.
The international community must follow through on its demands and stop the regime’s barrel bombs and air attacks – even if that means with a ‘no fly zone’.
You’ll also find Planet Syria on Facebook and Twitter.
Monday, 23 March 2015
Ask your MP to support Syria Civil Defence – ‘The White Helmets’
Cross-posted from Syria Solidarity UK.
Syria Civil Defence, known as The White Helmets, are volunteer rescue workers who have saved thousands of people from the rubble of air attacks.
After Assad’s forces again attacked civilians with chlorine bombs on 16th of March, Syria Civil Defence called on UN Security Council members to enforce a no-fly zone.
You can help.
If you live in the UK, this page can help you write an email to your MP.
Please ask your MP to support The White Helmets in their call for action to end Assad’s air attacks.
Get started here.
Photo above: Kafranbel protesters call for a No-Fly Zone, 21 March. More here.
Below: London protest outside the US Embassy, 22 March. More here.
Syria Civil Defence, known as The White Helmets, are volunteer rescue workers who have saved thousands of people from the rubble of air attacks.
After Assad’s forces again attacked civilians with chlorine bombs on 16th of March, Syria Civil Defence called on UN Security Council members to enforce a no-fly zone.
You can help.
If you live in the UK, this page can help you write an email to your MP.
Please ask your MP to support The White Helmets in their call for action to end Assad’s air attacks.
Get started here.
Photo above: Kafranbel protesters call for a No-Fly Zone, 21 March. More here.
Below: London protest outside the US Embassy, 22 March. More here.
Saturday, 14 March 2015
Four years is too long
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
Last year, two out of every five civilians killed in Syria were killed by Assad’s air attacks.
Over half the women killed last year were killed by Assad’s air attacks.
Over half the children killed last year were killed by Assad’s air attacks.
There is no other single measure that could do as much to save civilian lives as stopping Assad’s air force.
Some say this should be done by giving the Free Syrian Army anti-aircraft weapons. That might help, but not enough. Not enough to stop Assad’s bombers. There are too many. They attack over too wide an area. They fly too high.
So the best way, the one way, the only way to ground Assad’s air force, is for the UK, France, the USA, one or all of them I don’t care, to make the decision.
Make the call.
Tell Assad this stops now. Tell him, your bombing stops now or we start hitting your air bases. UK, France, USA, ground Assad’s air force.
Four years is too long.
Syria needs a No-Fly Zone.
Join us today in London.
Last year, two out of every five civilians killed in Syria were killed by Assad’s air attacks.
Over half the women killed last year were killed by Assad’s air attacks.
Over half the children killed last year were killed by Assad’s air attacks.
There is no other single measure that could do as much to save civilian lives as stopping Assad’s air force.
Some say this should be done by giving the Free Syrian Army anti-aircraft weapons. That might help, but not enough. Not enough to stop Assad’s bombers. There are too many. They attack over too wide an area. They fly too high.
So the best way, the one way, the only way to ground Assad’s air force, is for the UK, France, the USA, one or all of them I don’t care, to make the decision.
Make the call.
Tell Assad this stops now. Tell him, your bombing stops now or we start hitting your air bases. UK, France, USA, ground Assad’s air force.
Four years is too long.
Syria needs a No-Fly Zone.
Join us today in London.
Tuesday, 9 December 2014
Deter and Retaliate
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
BUFFER ZONES, SAFE ZONES, AIR-EXCLUSION ZONES
The week from Sunday 30th November to Sunday 7th December started with a lot of words published on the possibility of a no-fly zone in Syria, and ended with a practical demonstration of the feasibility of imposing one. It began with three news stories, all based on leaks or off-record conversations by US officials about ongoing negotiations between retired Marine Gen. John Allen, US special presidential envoy, and Turkish officials on the possibility of establishing a ‘safe zone’ in Northern Syria where civilians and rebels would have a degree of protection from both Assad forces and ISIS.
And then on Sunday the 7th of December Israel again demonstrated how vulnerable the Assad regime is to air attack by carrying out daylight strikes on the outskirts of Damascus.
DETER AND RETALIATE
Worth noting in the three initial news reports about safe zone negotiations is that the plan they describe envisages a no-fly zone maintained by deterrence and retaliation rather than by either air patrol and interception as seen in Bosnia and Iraq in the 1990s, or eradication of regime air assets as seen in Libya in 2011. From the Wall Street Journal version:
While there’s an implication in the article that a Deter and Retaliate approach can only work for a limited scale no-fly zone, recent events in Syria suggest that it would work for a no-fly zone over the entire country. Three experiences point to Assad being susceptible to deterrence: his agreement to allow the removal of chemical weapons following the threat of military action; the lack of any military response by Assad to US-led forces carrying out strikes in Syrian territory; and the lack of any direct military response by Assad to Israel’s repeated strikes against his military. Assad clearly knows he is unlikely to survive a direct military conflict with the US or its allies, and will go as far as possible to avoid one. As to retaliation, yesterday’s daylight strikes by Israel against Assad’s military in the Damascus area once again make clear that it is well within the means of the US and its allies to retaliate should Assad defy a no-fly zone.
Finally, how would a Deter and Retaliate no-fly zone work, and why might it be preferable to a patrolled no-fly zone, or to eradicating Assad’s air force?
The US and its allies already have the means to monitor Syrian territory to detect air attacks, and have the means available to retaliate in the event of any attacks taking place, so the next step would be to demand an immediate end to air attacks by Assad’s air force, and declare that any further attacks will be met with a punitive military response. There is a good chance the Assad regime would comply fully with this demand in order not to risk being hit by US strikes. If however the Assad regime decided to test US resolve by carrying out one or more air attacks, the US and its allies would not seek to intercept the particular aircraft violating the no-fly zone; instead they would first verify that an attack had taken place, and then respond with an attack against a target of their choice, for example Assad aircraft on the ground or other similar military targets.
There are major advantages in this Deter and Retaliate approach compared to patrols or eradication. Not engaging in patrolling or interception is safer for air crews. Avoiding the wide-scale strikes needed to eradicate Assad’s air force lowers the risk of unintended civilian casualties as well as lowering risk to air crews. And of course avoiding patrols and wide-scale strikes also makes Deter and Retaliate cheaper. It could cost as little as a phone call.
There would be three justifications for declaring such a no-fly zone. One, as with earlier chemical attacks by Assad forces, the regime’s deliberate targeting of civilian areas blatantly contravenes established international humanitarian law. Two, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2139, passed in February, demanded an end to such attacks. Three, such attacks hamper efforts by the US and its allies to combat ISIS.
RELATED POSTS
BUFFER ZONES, SAFE ZONES, AIR-EXCLUSION ZONES
The week from Sunday 30th November to Sunday 7th December started with a lot of words published on the possibility of a no-fly zone in Syria, and ended with a practical demonstration of the feasibility of imposing one. It began with three news stories, all based on leaks or off-record conversations by US officials about ongoing negotiations between retired Marine Gen. John Allen, US special presidential envoy, and Turkish officials on the possibility of establishing a ‘safe zone’ in Northern Syria where civilians and rebels would have a degree of protection from both Assad forces and ISIS.
- From Bloomberg View, 30th November:
Will U.S. and Turkey Create a Syria No-Fly Zone? By Josh Rogin and Eli Lake.
- From the Wall Street Journal, updated 1st December:
U.S., Turkey Narrow Differences on Islamic State Fight, by Adam Entous.
- From The Washington Post, 1st December:
U.S. considers opening new front against Islamic State to create a safe zone in Syria, by Karen DeYoung.
- Colonel Steve Warren, Pentagon spokesperson, 1st December:
“Right now, we don’t believe a buffer zone is the best way to relieve the humanitarian crisis there in northern Syria.”
- Josh Earnest, White House spokesperson, 1st December:
“… At this point, we don’t believe that a no-fly zone fits the bill here.”
- Susan Rice, National Security Advisor to President Obama, 2nd December:
“We are not moving in the direction of a no-fly zone or a safe haven at this point,” and “We think the establishment of a no-fly zone or a safe zone, at this point, is at best premature, and would be a major investment of resources that would be something, frankly, of a diversion from the primary task at hand.”
And then on Sunday the 7th of December Israel again demonstrated how vulnerable the Assad regime is to air attack by carrying out daylight strikes on the outskirts of Damascus.
DETER AND RETALIATE
Worth noting in the three initial news reports about safe zone negotiations is that the plan they describe envisages a no-fly zone maintained by deterrence and retaliation rather than by either air patrol and interception as seen in Bosnia and Iraq in the 1990s, or eradication of regime air assets as seen in Libya in 2011. From the Wall Street Journal version:
In contrast to a formal no-fly zone, the narrower safe zone along the border under discussion wouldn’t require any strikes to take out Syrian air defenses. Instead, the U.S. and its coalition partners could send a quiet warning to the Assad regime to stay away from the zone or risk retaliation.
While there’s an implication in the article that a Deter and Retaliate approach can only work for a limited scale no-fly zone, recent events in Syria suggest that it would work for a no-fly zone over the entire country. Three experiences point to Assad being susceptible to deterrence: his agreement to allow the removal of chemical weapons following the threat of military action; the lack of any military response by Assad to US-led forces carrying out strikes in Syrian territory; and the lack of any direct military response by Assad to Israel’s repeated strikes against his military. Assad clearly knows he is unlikely to survive a direct military conflict with the US or its allies, and will go as far as possible to avoid one. As to retaliation, yesterday’s daylight strikes by Israel against Assad’s military in the Damascus area once again make clear that it is well within the means of the US and its allies to retaliate should Assad defy a no-fly zone.
Finally, how would a Deter and Retaliate no-fly zone work, and why might it be preferable to a patrolled no-fly zone, or to eradicating Assad’s air force?
The US and its allies already have the means to monitor Syrian territory to detect air attacks, and have the means available to retaliate in the event of any attacks taking place, so the next step would be to demand an immediate end to air attacks by Assad’s air force, and declare that any further attacks will be met with a punitive military response. There is a good chance the Assad regime would comply fully with this demand in order not to risk being hit by US strikes. If however the Assad regime decided to test US resolve by carrying out one or more air attacks, the US and its allies would not seek to intercept the particular aircraft violating the no-fly zone; instead they would first verify that an attack had taken place, and then respond with an attack against a target of their choice, for example Assad aircraft on the ground or other similar military targets.
There are major advantages in this Deter and Retaliate approach compared to patrols or eradication. Not engaging in patrolling or interception is safer for air crews. Avoiding the wide-scale strikes needed to eradicate Assad’s air force lowers the risk of unintended civilian casualties as well as lowering risk to air crews. And of course avoiding patrols and wide-scale strikes also makes Deter and Retaliate cheaper. It could cost as little as a phone call.
There would be three justifications for declaring such a no-fly zone. One, as with earlier chemical attacks by Assad forces, the regime’s deliberate targeting of civilian areas blatantly contravenes established international humanitarian law. Two, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2139, passed in February, demanded an end to such attacks. Three, such attacks hamper efforts by the US and its allies to combat ISIS.
RELATED POSTS
- Stop the barrel bombs: A moral and legal responsibility to use force
- Seven months on: Enforce UNSCR 2139
- Obama’s Syria menu: Where’s the No-Fly Zone?
- No-Fly Zone options: Reasons for favouring a limited strike option
Sunday, 30 November 2014
Raqqa: to appease Iran, Obama gives Assad’s air force a free pass for slaughter
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
Along with barrel bombings in towns and cities across Syria, this last week saw a series of attacks by Assad’s air force on civilian targets in the northern town of Raqqa. These regime air attacks were sandwiched between two weekends of airstrikes by the US-led coalition on ISIS targets in Raqqa.
When US and allied air forces first began strikes in Syria, there was speculation that their presence would deter attacks by Assad’s air force against civilians, at least in the US area of operations. This past week’s events demonstrates that any such deterrent effect is fading if not over. The taking of turns in Raqqa’s airspace by Assad’s air force and US-led forces further undermines US claims of concern for the fate of Syrian civilians.
RAQQA AIRSTRIKES 23-29 NOVEMBER
On Sunday 23 November, US warplanes carried out two strikes against an ISIS-occupied building in the city of Raqqa in north-eastern Syria. No civilian casualties were reported.
On Tuesday 25 November, Assad’s air force carried out ten air attacks on Raqqa, reportedly killing as many as 209 people, most if not all civilians. Targets were reported to include a busy marketplace, a bus depot, and a mosque where dozens of people were gathered for prayers.
On Thursday 27 November, Assad’s air force carried out between seven and ten further attacks, including one at the city’s National Hospital, reportedly killing at least seven more people.
On Friday 28 November, Assad’s air force carried out three attacks in Raqqa, killing at least five people including three children.
On Saturday 29 November, Assad’s air force again attacked Raqqa’s National Hospital. LCC Syria named five people killed.
In the evening of Saturday 29 November, US-led coalition aircraft were reported to have carried out at least 15 airstrikes. Later reports said the total had exceeded 30 airstrikes. The activist group Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently reported that all the targets of the US-led coalition were ISIS bases, hitting a high number of ISIS fighters.
CASUALTY REPORTS
The following are press reports of casualties from Tuesday’s attacks in Raqqa. Numbers given for people killed rose over time. No press reports gave precise numbers for people maimed and injured.
RESPONSES
The next day State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki did her best to convince the world that the US opposed the strikes:
BACKGROUND
The above assertion by un-named Obama administration officials reported October 7th was refuted the following day by New York Times journalist Anne Barnard in an article titled US Focus on ISIS Frees Syria to Battle Rebels, where she gave a taste of the ongoing air attacks being carried out by Assad’s air force from the same air space being flown by US and allied air forces.
There is some evidence that Assad scaled back air attacks following the start of US strikes within Syria. According to the Violations Documentation Center in Syria, recorded numbers of people confirmed killed by air attacks in the first twelve days from 23 September showed a dramatic drop compared to the period before US strikes began. In the weeks following the recorded numbers of daily deaths rose again, but the number confirmed killed in October was still lower than in September.
It should be noted that VDC figures are minimum counts of confirmed violent deaths, and are by their nature most likely to be an undercount of the true total killed. For details see two posts by @lopforum:
It’s hard to draw clear conclusions on regime intentions from numbers of violent deaths alone. Since the peak number for violent deaths recorded in August 2012, vast numbers of Syrians have fled the country, consequently reducing the number at risk of being killed in any attack. Also, since that 2012 peak in killing, Syrian ground forces and militia have been reinforced by Iranian and Hezbollah forces, who may be more professional and militarily focused in their approach.
However, looking just at deaths from air attacks, one can see that a rise up to August 2013 seems to have been interrupted by the threat of an international response to the Ghouta chemical weapons attack, only to be resumed with increased ferocity once that threat had clearly passed in December 2013. Killings by air attacks peaked in February 2014, but dropped following the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 2139 which explicitly demanded an end to barrel bombing and threatened further action in the event of non-compliance. As that threat of UN Security Council action faded, the rate of killing by air was again rising in September 2014 before the US-led Coalition action against ISIS in Syria began.
It was reasonable then to expect the post-intervention lull in killing to be short-lived—for it to be followed by a tentative escalation to test the risk of a US response, then greater escalation as no US substantial response came—and short-lived it now seems to have been.
Targeting civilians is the rule rather than the exception for Assad’s air force. Most attacks are too inaccurate for the regime to risk striking front-line rebel fighters as they could just as easily hit Assad’s own forces, so instead air attacks are used to terrorise, destabilise, and depopulate areas outside of regime control. Historically Assad’s air force has focused these attacks on areas under rebel control, not areas under ISIS control, as the regime apparently sees ISIS as less of a threat to its rule, and according to many reports actively colludes with ISIS to weaken rebel forces. As ISIS in Raqqa has come under US attack, it may be that the Assad regime sees a danger of Raqqa again becoming independent of both ISIS and the regime, and has therefore decided to target the city with increased ferocity.
For an analysis of the Assad regime’s air bombardment strategy see Barrel Bombs: A tool to force displacement in Eastern Aleppo, by Ryan O’Farrell, Tahrir Souri, via EA WorldView.
APPEASING IRAN
Dennis Ross, a former special assistant to President Obama, points to two reasons the Obama Administration does not want to strike Assad’s air force, both related to Iran. One reason is the fear, voiced to him by “a senior administration official” that any direct attack on Assad by the US would be met with retaliation by Iran’s militia proxies against US forces in Iraq. The other reason is Obama’s desire to reach a nuclear agreement with Iran.
According to leaked accounts, a recent letter from President Obama to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the nuclear negotiations included an assurance that the US didn’t intend to strike Assad’s forces in Syria. When those negotiations, supposed to conclude on Monday 24 November, were instead extended to a completion deadline of 1 June 2015, Assad would have had good reason to believe that Obama’s assurance not to use direct military force against him was now similarly extended.
Such a belief would no doubt have been reinforced by the dismissal of Chuck Hagel, US Defense Secretary, which also came on Monday 24 November. This was generally believed to be linked to Hagel’s criticism of Obama’s hands-off policy towards Assad. With the reassurance of these two events, it seems Assad felt safe to proceed the next day with his wave of attacks against Raqqa’s population.
The term appeasement is often overused. To negotiate with an enemy, to try and reach a peaceful settlement, is not in itself appeasement. But to trade the life and liberty of another country’s citizens in the pursuit of a hoped-for settlement that doesn’t serve their interests, that is a trade-off that deserves the name appeasement.
Obama’s free pass to Assad’s air force in exchange for a hoped-for nuclear deal with Iran is appeasement, and no form of public relations statement from the State Department’s spokesperson can alter that harsh fact.
Along with barrel bombings in towns and cities across Syria, this last week saw a series of attacks by Assad’s air force on civilian targets in the northern town of Raqqa. These regime air attacks were sandwiched between two weekends of airstrikes by the US-led coalition on ISIS targets in Raqqa.
When US and allied air forces first began strikes in Syria, there was speculation that their presence would deter attacks by Assad’s air force against civilians, at least in the US area of operations. This past week’s events demonstrates that any such deterrent effect is fading if not over. The taking of turns in Raqqa’s airspace by Assad’s air force and US-led forces further undermines US claims of concern for the fate of Syrian civilians.
RAQQA AIRSTRIKES 23-29 NOVEMBER
On Sunday 23 November, US warplanes carried out two strikes against an ISIS-occupied building in the city of Raqqa in north-eastern Syria. No civilian casualties were reported.
On Tuesday 25 November, Assad’s air force carried out ten air attacks on Raqqa, reportedly killing as many as 209 people, most if not all civilians. Targets were reported to include a busy marketplace, a bus depot, and a mosque where dozens of people were gathered for prayers.
On Thursday 27 November, Assad’s air force carried out between seven and ten further attacks, including one at the city’s National Hospital, reportedly killing at least seven more people.
On Friday 28 November, Assad’s air force carried out three attacks in Raqqa, killing at least five people including three children.
On Saturday 29 November, Assad’s air force again attacked Raqqa’s National Hospital. LCC Syria named five people killed.
In the evening of Saturday 29 November, US-led coalition aircraft were reported to have carried out at least 15 airstrikes. Later reports said the total had exceeded 30 airstrikes. The activist group Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently reported that all the targets of the US-led coalition were ISIS bases, hitting a high number of ISIS fighters.
CASUALTY REPORTS
The following are press reports of casualties from Tuesday’s attacks in Raqqa. Numbers given for people killed rose over time. No press reports gave precise numbers for people maimed and injured.
- Activists: Syrian strikes kill 60 in IS-held city, Associated Press, 25 November.
Cites initial counts of number killed – SOHR: over 60, LCC: at least 70, Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently: over 80 killed. - Syria conflict: Raqqa air strikes death toll rises, BBC News, updated 26 November.
Cites LCC as documenting 87 deaths and warning of more injured likely to die due to lack of medical facilities. Cites SOHR saying at least 95 killed, of whom at least 52 have been confirmed as civilians. - ‘Scores dead’ in air strikes on Syria’s Raqaa, Al Jazeera, updated 26 November.
Updated to cite activists as saying 135 people were killed. - By Friday 28 November, the activist group Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently said they had documented 209 people killed in Tuesday’s air attacks.
RESPONSES
Government in #Syria has launched airstrikes designed to hit #ISIS in #Raqqa; civilians caught in the crossfire: http://t.co/dPIKrMWay8
— StateCSO (@StateCSO) November 25, 2014
The above tweet from the US Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations was widely retweeted, reproduced, and criticised for characterising the Assad air force attacks as a misfired attempt to target ISIS when there was no evidence given in the linked story or elsewhere that the intended target was ISIS rather than the civilian victims.The next day State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki did her best to convince the world that the US opposed the strikes:
- US ‘horrified’ by Syrian raids on Raqqa, AFP, 27 November.
- Syrian National Coalition Demands Use of Force Against Syrian Regime Aircraft Targeting Civilians from US Area of Operations, Syrian Coalition statement, 26 November.
- Syrian Coalition Decries the US-led Alliance’s Silence over Al Raqqa Massacre, Syrian Coalition statement, 27 November.
- Conflicting Policies on Syria and Islamic State Erode U.S. Standing in Mideast, Anne Barnard, The New York Times, 27 November.
- Syria, U.S. attack same Syrian city, then trade barbs, Hugh Naylor, The Washington Post, 28 November.
- The exchange of roles between the Alliance and Assad freak out US State Department, Hamoud Al-Mousa, Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, 28 November.
This post from Friday put the number killed in Tuesday’s attacks at 209. It said that with further regime air attacks on Thursday the week’s total had reached 232 people killed and hundreds injured.
BACKGROUND
Officials note, for example, that the American-led coalition, with its heavy rotation of flights and airstrikes, has effectively imposed a no-fly zone over northern Syria already…
The above assertion by un-named Obama administration officials reported October 7th was refuted the following day by New York Times journalist Anne Barnard in an article titled US Focus on ISIS Frees Syria to Battle Rebels, where she gave a taste of the ongoing air attacks being carried out by Assad’s air force from the same air space being flown by US and allied air forces.
There is some evidence that Assad scaled back air attacks following the start of US strikes within Syria. According to the Violations Documentation Center in Syria, recorded numbers of people confirmed killed by air attacks in the first twelve days from 23 September showed a dramatic drop compared to the period before US strikes began. In the weeks following the recorded numbers of daily deaths rose again, but the number confirmed killed in October was still lower than in September.
It should be noted that VDC figures are minimum counts of confirmed violent deaths, and are by their nature most likely to be an undercount of the true total killed. For details see two posts by @lopforum:
- Impact of Coalition Airstrikes: Civilian Deaths due to Airstrikes Since September 1
- Syrian Civilian Casualties in October
It’s hard to draw clear conclusions on regime intentions from numbers of violent deaths alone. Since the peak number for violent deaths recorded in August 2012, vast numbers of Syrians have fled the country, consequently reducing the number at risk of being killed in any attack. Also, since that 2012 peak in killing, Syrian ground forces and militia have been reinforced by Iranian and Hezbollah forces, who may be more professional and militarily focused in their approach.
 |
| Chart by @lopforum based on VDC Syria data |
However, looking just at deaths from air attacks, one can see that a rise up to August 2013 seems to have been interrupted by the threat of an international response to the Ghouta chemical weapons attack, only to be resumed with increased ferocity once that threat had clearly passed in December 2013. Killings by air attacks peaked in February 2014, but dropped following the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 2139 which explicitly demanded an end to barrel bombing and threatened further action in the event of non-compliance. As that threat of UN Security Council action faded, the rate of killing by air was again rising in September 2014 before the US-led Coalition action against ISIS in Syria began.
It was reasonable then to expect the post-intervention lull in killing to be short-lived—for it to be followed by a tentative escalation to test the risk of a US response, then greater escalation as no US substantial response came—and short-lived it now seems to have been.
Targeting civilians is the rule rather than the exception for Assad’s air force. Most attacks are too inaccurate for the regime to risk striking front-line rebel fighters as they could just as easily hit Assad’s own forces, so instead air attacks are used to terrorise, destabilise, and depopulate areas outside of regime control. Historically Assad’s air force has focused these attacks on areas under rebel control, not areas under ISIS control, as the regime apparently sees ISIS as less of a threat to its rule, and according to many reports actively colludes with ISIS to weaken rebel forces. As ISIS in Raqqa has come under US attack, it may be that the Assad regime sees a danger of Raqqa again becoming independent of both ISIS and the regime, and has therefore decided to target the city with increased ferocity.
For an analysis of the Assad regime’s air bombardment strategy see Barrel Bombs: A tool to force displacement in Eastern Aleppo, by Ryan O’Farrell, Tahrir Souri, via EA WorldView.
APPEASING IRAN
Dennis Ross, a former special assistant to President Obama, points to two reasons the Obama Administration does not want to strike Assad’s air force, both related to Iran. One reason is the fear, voiced to him by “a senior administration official” that any direct attack on Assad by the US would be met with retaliation by Iran’s militia proxies against US forces in Iraq. The other reason is Obama’s desire to reach a nuclear agreement with Iran.
According to leaked accounts, a recent letter from President Obama to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the nuclear negotiations included an assurance that the US didn’t intend to strike Assad’s forces in Syria. When those negotiations, supposed to conclude on Monday 24 November, were instead extended to a completion deadline of 1 June 2015, Assad would have had good reason to believe that Obama’s assurance not to use direct military force against him was now similarly extended.
Such a belief would no doubt have been reinforced by the dismissal of Chuck Hagel, US Defense Secretary, which also came on Monday 24 November. This was generally believed to be linked to Hagel’s criticism of Obama’s hands-off policy towards Assad. With the reassurance of these two events, it seems Assad felt safe to proceed the next day with his wave of attacks against Raqqa’s population.
The term appeasement is often overused. To negotiate with an enemy, to try and reach a peaceful settlement, is not in itself appeasement. But to trade the life and liberty of another country’s citizens in the pursuit of a hoped-for settlement that doesn’t serve their interests, that is a trade-off that deserves the name appeasement.
Obama’s free pass to Assad’s air force in exchange for a hoped-for nuclear deal with Iran is appeasement, and no form of public relations statement from the State Department’s spokesperson can alter that harsh fact.
Friday, 17 October 2014
Italy must not block EU sanctions on aviation fuel sales to Syria
The Italian government is reportedly blocking proposed EU sanctions against aviation fuel sales to the Syrian regime. A vote is expected on Monday. The Syria Campaign has an urgent action page with a form to email Italy's Foreign Minister.
UPDATE Monday 20 October – the measure has been passed.
EU governments agree to ban jet fuel exports to Syria, Reuters 20 October 2014.
UPDATE Monday 20 October – the measure has been passed.
EU governments agree to ban jet fuel exports to Syria, Reuters 20 October 2014.
Saturday, 4 October 2014
Over 13,000 killed by air attacks
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
Over 13,000 civilians have been killed by air attacks since 2011.
No more excuses.
Syria needs a No-Fly Zone.
Source: VDC Syria database.
READ MORE
Over 13,000 civilians have been killed by air attacks since 2011.
No more excuses.
Syria needs a No-Fly Zone.
Source: VDC Syria database.
READ MORE
- Obama’s Syria menu: Where’s the No-Fly Zone?
- Seven months on: Enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 2139
- Stop the barrel bombs: A moral and legal responsibility to use force
Friday, 3 October 2014
No more excuses
Cross posted from NFZSyria.org.
The Violations Documentation Center in Syria now lists over 50 individual civilians killed by Assad air attacks since the US-led Coalition began operations in Syria.
Regime attacks seemed at first to be dropping, but Reuters now report an increase as Assad forces adapt to the new circumstances.
Allowing Assad to carry on bombing civilians at the very same time as the US-led Coalition is militarily active in Syria is untenable.
No more excuses.
Stop the barrel bombs.
Syria needs a No-Fly Zone.
REFERENCES
The Violations Documentation Center in Syria now lists over 50 individual civilians killed by Assad air attacks since the US-led Coalition began operations in Syria.
Regime attacks seemed at first to be dropping, but Reuters now report an increase as Assad forces adapt to the new circumstances.
Allowing Assad to carry on bombing civilians at the very same time as the US-led Coalition is militarily active in Syria is untenable.
No more excuses.
Stop the barrel bombs.
Syria needs a No-Fly Zone.
REFERENCES
- List of civilians killed by regime air attacks since the start of the US-led Coalition operations in Syria
VDC Syria database.
- Impact of Coalition airstrikes
Syria Statistical & Video Documentation @lopforum, 30 September 2014.
- Syria’s army goes on the offensive as US bombs Assad’s foes
By Laila Bassam and Sylvia Westall, Reuters, 2 October 2014. - Coalition risks loss of support unless it clarifies its aims
By Hassan Hassan, The National, 1 October 2014.
Tuesday, 30 September 2014
Seven months on: Enforce UNSCR 2139
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2139, adopted on 22 February this year, included a demand for an end to indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombardment of populated areas, particularly the use of barrel bombs.
Since that demand was made, over 4,400 civilians have been killed by Assad’s air force. Despite the US-led intervention in Syria, Assad’s helicopters are still dropping barrel bombs. Yesterday, Monday 29 September, saw reports of government helicopters attacking Khan Asal, Hriytan, and Qarah in Aleppo province, dropping barrel bombs on Bait Jin and other locations in Damascus suburbs, and on Inkhel in Daraa, and on Kafr-Zeita, and so on and on. More reports are coming in of fatal barrel bomb attacks today.
The US-led Coalition strikes against ISIS/ISIL/IS and others in Syria have added 27 civilians killed to the toll. What they haven’t done is acted to stop regime attacks on civilians.
Stopping air attacks on residential areas would be a relatively straightforward task for Security Council members. President Obama has been quoted by the New York Times as saying it would be easier to “wipe out” Syrian air defences than hit ISIS, the current target of US action in Syria.
UNSC Resolution 2139 requested the UN Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution in 30 days of its adoption, and every 30 days thereafter, and expressed the Security Council’s intent to take further steps in the case of non-compliance.
Since then, the Secretary-General has as requested provided the Security Council with seven detailed reports . The latest report, dated 24 September, included the following:
The Security Council’s failure to take any further steps to stop air attacks on civilians is an abdication of its responsibility.
The US-led coalition’s ongoing failure to act against the Assad air force’s ongoing massacre of civilians is a betrayal of humanity.
Ground Assad’s air force. Stop the barrel bombs. Enforce UNSCR 2139.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2139, adopted on 22 February this year, included a demand for an end to indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombardment of populated areas, particularly the use of barrel bombs.
The US-led Coalition strikes against ISIS/ISIL/IS and others in Syria have added 27 civilians killed to the toll. What they haven’t done is acted to stop regime attacks on civilians.
Stopping air attacks on residential areas would be a relatively straightforward task for Security Council members. President Obama has been quoted by the New York Times as saying it would be easier to “wipe out” Syrian air defences than hit ISIS, the current target of US action in Syria.
UNSC Resolution 2139 requested the UN Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution in 30 days of its adoption, and every 30 days thereafter, and expressed the Security Council’s intent to take further steps in the case of non-compliance.
Since then, the Secretary-General has as requested provided the Security Council with seven detailed reports . The latest report, dated 24 September, included the following:
Air strikes, shelling and indiscriminate barrel bomb attacks by government forces continued on opposition-held areas, notably in Aleppo and Damascus governorates, resulting in a high number of civilian casualties. In Aleppo, government forces reportedly continued their campaign of barrel bomb attacks, which has been ongoing since mid-December 2013. OHCHR received reports that at least 55 civilians, including 17 children and 7 women, were killed as a result of such attacks between 19 August and 3 September. In Damascus governorate, government forces reportedly intensified attacks against the opposition-held areas of Joubar and several locations in eastern Ghouta. Reports indicate that Joubar was subjected to dozens of air raids and heavy shelling on 2 and 3 September, resulting in the death of at least 10 civilians, while aerial bombardment by government forces reportedly killed at least 120 people and injured hundreds of people in Douma (eastern Ghouta).
Dar`a, Hama and Idlib governorates have also been severely affected by indiscriminate attacks by government forces. For example, in Dar`a governorate, an analysis by the Operational Satellite Applications Programme of satellite imagery collected on 5 September indicated ongoing bombardment of the city of Dar`a, most likely, in some instances, by barrel bombs. Possible damage is visible elsewhere in the city and is likely the result of conventional artillery, light air-dropped munitions or other causes. According to information gathered by OHCHR, on 30 August 2014, missile attacks by government forces on the city of Saraqib (Idlib), reportedly led to the death of at least 15 people, including 8 children and 4 women. Another reported missile attack by government forces, on 3 September, in the town of Naqir (Idlib), led to the death of five civilians. In Hama, 16 civilians were reportedly killed by shelling in Tal Khaznah
The Security Council’s failure to take any further steps to stop air attacks on civilians is an abdication of its responsibility.
The US-led coalition’s ongoing failure to act against the Assad air force’s ongoing massacre of civilians is a betrayal of humanity.
Ground Assad’s air force. Stop the barrel bombs. Enforce UNSCR 2139.
Thursday, 11 September 2014
Obama’s Syria menu: Where’s the No-Fly Zone?
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
President Obama’s televised speech yesterday on US action to fight IS (Islamic State / ISIS / ISIL / DAESH) in Syria as well as in Iraq was preceded by a White House dinner with a bipartisan group of foreign policy experts, amongst other communications efforts. Missing from the speech, from dinner reports, from briefings by government spokespeople named and unnamed, was any mention of measures to stop the Assad regime’s ongoing bombing campaign against Syrian civilians.
The Violations Documentation Center in Syria has recorded over 13,200 individuals killed by Assad’s air attacks to date. That’s a minimum count of confirmed killings compiled by one organisation, not the total number killed. Of those, the vast majority were civilians: 12,661 to date, a number likely higher by the time you click on the link. This killing is ongoing: 260 of those civilians were recorded killed in the first ten days of this month.
Assad’s air war is not just a deliberate ongoing threat to civilians, it is also a major threat to the US strategy for fighting IS because that strategy relies on partnering with Syrian opposition forces, and also on establishing inclusive functioning governments in both Iraq and Syria to provide security for all sections of their populations. “A government that can protect them. A government that makes sure that their families are safe…”
Now that Obama has committed the US to fighting IS in Syria by means of both US strikes and greater support for Syrian opposition forces fighting IS on the ground, immediate measures should be taken to stop Assad’s attacks.
The US should declare that Assad’s air attacks are not only an ongoing breach of UN Security Council Resolution 2139, but are also a threat to US allies in the fight against IS, and a threat to US air operations against IS, and consequently the US should demand the immediate grounding of all military flights by Assad regime aircraft. Any further action by Assad aircraft should be punished by attacks on regime air assets: aircraft, airfields, ammunition stores, and air defences.
This would in effect impose a No-Fly Zone, not by the continuous patrol means seen in the 1990s in Bosnia and Iraq, nor by eradication as seen in Libya, but by means of deterrence and retaliation. This would be both safer and cheaper than other NFZ options.
Failure to take action against regime bombing of civilians would undermine support for US action against IS amongst the Syrian population, as well as exposing US allies amongst the Syrian opposition to avoidable danger. Furthermore, allowing regime air attacks on civilians to continue alongside US air attacks on IS would risk the US being blamed for deaths and injuries caused by the regime.
RELATED POSTS
President Obama’s televised speech yesterday on US action to fight IS (Islamic State / ISIS / ISIL / DAESH) in Syria as well as in Iraq was preceded by a White House dinner with a bipartisan group of foreign policy experts, amongst other communications efforts. Missing from the speech, from dinner reports, from briefings by government spokespeople named and unnamed, was any mention of measures to stop the Assad regime’s ongoing bombing campaign against Syrian civilians.
The Violations Documentation Center in Syria has recorded over 13,200 individuals killed by Assad’s air attacks to date. That’s a minimum count of confirmed killings compiled by one organisation, not the total number killed. Of those, the vast majority were civilians: 12,661 to date, a number likely higher by the time you click on the link. This killing is ongoing: 260 of those civilians were recorded killed in the first ten days of this month.
Assad’s air war is not just a deliberate ongoing threat to civilians, it is also a major threat to the US strategy for fighting IS because that strategy relies on partnering with Syrian opposition forces, and also on establishing inclusive functioning governments in both Iraq and Syria to provide security for all sections of their populations. “A government that can protect them. A government that makes sure that their families are safe…”
Now that Obama has committed the US to fighting IS in Syria by means of both US strikes and greater support for Syrian opposition forces fighting IS on the ground, immediate measures should be taken to stop Assad’s attacks.
The US should declare that Assad’s air attacks are not only an ongoing breach of UN Security Council Resolution 2139, but are also a threat to US allies in the fight against IS, and a threat to US air operations against IS, and consequently the US should demand the immediate grounding of all military flights by Assad regime aircraft. Any further action by Assad aircraft should be punished by attacks on regime air assets: aircraft, airfields, ammunition stores, and air defences.
This would in effect impose a No-Fly Zone, not by the continuous patrol means seen in the 1990s in Bosnia and Iraq, nor by eradication as seen in Libya, but by means of deterrence and retaliation. This would be both safer and cheaper than other NFZ options.
Failure to take action against regime bombing of civilians would undermine support for US action against IS amongst the Syrian population, as well as exposing US allies amongst the Syrian opposition to avoidable danger. Furthermore, allowing regime air attacks on civilians to continue alongside US air attacks on IS would risk the US being blamed for deaths and injuries caused by the regime.
RELATED POSTS
- No-Fly Zone options: Reasons for favouring a limited strike option
- Enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 2139
- Stop the barrel bombs: A moral and legal responsibility to use force
- Transcript: President Obama’s speech outlining strategy to defeat Islamic State
Washington Post, 10 September 2014. - Obama ready to strike at Islamic State militants in Syria, he tells policy experts
Juliet Eilperin and David Nakamura, Washington Post, 9 September 2014. - Transcript: President Obama’s Aug. 28 remarks on Ukraine, Syria and the economy
Washington Post, 28 August 2014.
- The Violations Documentation Center in Syria
- VDC document 3,000 Child Victims Of Airstrikes
Syria Statistical & Video Documentation @lopforum, 18 June 2014.
- Denying Flight: Strategic Options for Employing No-Fly Zones
Paper by Karl P. Mueller, RAND Corporation, 2013 (PDF). - Airpower Options for Syria: Assessing Objectives and Missions for Aerial Intervention
by Karl P. Mueller, Jeffrey Martini, Thomas Hamilton, RAND Corporation, 2013. - A Syrian No Fly Zone: Options and Constraints
Event at the US Institute of Peace, 29 May 2013, with Ambassador Frederic C. Hof, Lt. General David A. Deptula, USAF (Ret.), Jon Alterman, Joseph Holliday, and Steven Heydemann. - Strategic Horizons: For Syria No-Fly Zone, Less Is More
Steven Metz looks at limited-objective options for a no-fly zone, World Politics Review, 3 July 2013. - Syrian Air-Defense Capabilities and the Threat to Potential U.S. Air Operations
Chandler P. Atwood and Jeffrey White, The Washington Institute, 23 May 2014.
Thursday, 15 May 2014
Barrel Bombs: Syria’s Indiscriminate Killers
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
Barrel Bombs: Syria’s Indiscriminate Killers
Via UN Web TV, a special event yesterday organised by the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands and co-sponsored by the Permanent Missions of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey and the United States.
Introduced by the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN, H.E. Mr. Karel J.G. van Oosterom, the event includes a five minute compilation of videos of barrel bomb attacks, witnesses’ testimonies from Dr Samer Attar, a Syrian American Medical Society physician and from Ibrahim al-Assil, a member of Syrian Nonviolence Movement, and a Human Rights Watch presentation by Peggy Hicks.
Wednesday, 30 April 2014
Use force to stop the barrel bombs: On issues of morality, legality, practicality, and responsibility.
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
Update: PDF version here – please share.
This week’s BBC News story on the ongoing bombing of Syria’s civilians by the Assad regime is just the latest of countless reports. The bombing continues daily even if many Western news outlets now report it infrequently. For anyone who wants to know more about how the bombs are impacting men, women, and children, there are more than enough gruesome images of severed arms and legs, of children with their skulls split open, all available just a few clicks away.
A cooler assessment of the bombing’s impact is available in counts of lives taken, in counts of attacks, and in counts of refugee flow increases.
The Violations Documentation Center in Syria today lists 10,365 individuals killed in air attacks since the start of the conflict, 9,892 of them civilians, 1,656 of them under 18, and of those 1,150 children up to the age of 12. This is a minimum count of confirmed killed, not an estimate of the true total. The numbers will likely be higher by the time you click a link.
Of the over 10,000 individual killings by aircraft documented by the VDC, 2,887 took place since the start of this year, a rate of over 700 confirmed killed by air attacks per month.
Just looking at numbers killed doesn’t take account of the horrific scale of injuries. One doctor from Aleppo describes 40 to 50 injuries from one barrel bomb attack as the norm, an overwhelming escalation compared to his earlier experiences with mortar attacks that might injure 7 or 8.
Since February 22nd when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2139, which amongst other things demanded an end to air attacks on civilians, activists have logged at least 1,006 reported air attacks by Assad’s forces.
In February, UNHCR reported aid workers as saying the aerial bombing of Aleppo was causing one of the largest flows of refugees of the war, as many as 500,000. And the bombing has now continued for a further two months. The total number of refugees registered with UNHCR is now over 2.6 million.
Most recently there have been many reports of chlorine being used in barrel bombs, turning them into crude chemical weapons. While the 21 deaths in 14 attacks cited in a report by The Telegraph is a fraction of the number killed by the more usual non-CW air attacks, the chlorine bombs represent a clear breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention, signed by Syria last September, as well as being a breach of UNSC Resolution 2139 in common with the rest of the air attacks, and a crime under international humanitarian law.
To some, all this is enough to make a case for military intervention. Others doubt whether intervention can be effective, or believe it would be illegal, or think it would be impractical or prohibitively expensive, or think that it is not the responsibility of Western nations.
MORAL GROUNDS
I’ve previously argued (here and here) that the likely risk of civilians being killed in a military intervention is massively outweighed by the number of lives being taken by Assad’s air attacks. That case is even stronger now than then.
In NATO’s seven-month Libya air campaign, investigations by The New York Times, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty, counted between 40 and 115 civilians possibly killed by NATO aircraft. While it is right that NATO should be fully accountable to those it was tasked to protect, this number is a fraction of the number now being killed per month by air attacks in Syria: a minimum of over 700 every month as cited earlier.
Military action to disable Assad’s air force, more limited in aims and targets than NATO’s Libya campaign, would therefore most likely prevent very many more civilian deaths and injuries than it might cause.
When the Libya intervention is discussed, objectors point to the fact that Libya is still unstable to argue that military intervention was a failure. NATO’s mission was to protect civilians during the conflict, not establish stable government; nonetheless one can favourably compare Libya’s postwar instability with the situation in Syria. In all of 2013 there were reportedly 643 violent deaths in Libya. In Syria death tolls are now in excess of 200 daily according to the UN Secretary-General’s March report.
So much safer does Libya seem than Syria that the UNHCR has registered 17,589 Syrian refugees in Libya.
It’s also sometimes argued that war in Mali was a result of the Libya intervention, and thus demonstrates the folly of intervention in Syria. This ignores both the history of conflict in Mali, and the scale of the ongoing destabilisation in Lebanon and Iraq that is directly connected with allowing Syria’s war to rage on.
Military action against Assad’s air force would not in itself be likely to end the war, nor would it ensure a stable future for Syrians or their neighbours, but it would almost certainly prevent a big portion of the further suffering now promised to them. For those with the military means to act, there is a moral imperative to do so.
LEGAL GROUNDS
Indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas is prohibited under international humanitarian law.
The recent use of chlorine bombs violates the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a signatory.
UN Security Council Resolution 2139 on Syria “demands that all parties immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs…”
The Assad regime is therefore clearly, deliberately, continuously violating international law. But would a targeted military action to disable Assad’s air force also violate international law? Not according to UK Government legal opinion.
Minister of State Hugh Robertson reaffirmed in January that under certain circumstances the UK Government regards humanitarian intervention as legal even without a UN Security Council resolution. Those circumstances were defined in a Foreign and Commonwealth Office note circulated to NATO allies in October 1998 prior to the Kosovo intervention, as follows:
PRACTICAL OPTIONS
A patrolled No-Fly Zone such as was implemented over Bosnia, and later over northern and southern Iraq, would be an expensive open-ended commitment. It would also require the kind of capability to suppress enemy air defences only held by the US, so would not be an option without active US participation.
Use of Patriot missiles in Turkey has been proposed by some, but they’re better suited to defend against missile attack and can’t be safely used against enemy aircraft if friendly aircraft are operating in the same space.
Providing anti-aircraft weapons to rebels is seen as a serious security risk in case they might come into the wrong hands and be used against civilian aircraft.
The best option in Syria seems to be limited strikes against selected targets, whether deterrent strikes against a few choice targets to try and persuade Assad to comply with Resolution 2139 or a wider campaign of strikes against Assad’s air capacity.
Not only would this cost less than a full no-fly zone, but as the duration of a limited strike action would be shorter than a patrolled no-fly zone, and as air defences wouldn’t need to be targeted to the same degree, there should also be less risk to both air crews and to civilians on the ground.
OUR RESPONSIBILITY
There are only a few states capable of mounting carefully targeted military strikes against Assad. They include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Of those, Britain, France, and the United States are the only ones with previous experience of conducting such operations, and are also the only permanent members likely to support such action given Russia and China’s history of support for the Assad regime.
The capacity to act, the privilege of permanent membership of the Security Council, the protection of veto power in the Council; all of these mean a moral, legal, and political responsibility to act falls upon the governments of Britain, France, and the United States.
Continued failure to act undermines the moral standing of the UK, France, and US. It undermines the legal standing of UN Security Council resolutions, of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and of all international humanitarian law. It undermines the political position of UNSC permanent members, and undermines the current international order. It threatens our security.
This responsibility falls on these three governments collectively and individually. If one fails to act, that does not absolve the others. Each has both the power and the responsibility to act.
Update: PDF version here – please share.
This week’s BBC News story on the ongoing bombing of Syria’s civilians by the Assad regime is just the latest of countless reports. The bombing continues daily even if many Western news outlets now report it infrequently. For anyone who wants to know more about how the bombs are impacting men, women, and children, there are more than enough gruesome images of severed arms and legs, of children with their skulls split open, all available just a few clicks away.
A cooler assessment of the bombing’s impact is available in counts of lives taken, in counts of attacks, and in counts of refugee flow increases.
The Violations Documentation Center in Syria today lists 10,365 individuals killed in air attacks since the start of the conflict, 9,892 of them civilians, 1,656 of them under 18, and of those 1,150 children up to the age of 12. This is a minimum count of confirmed killed, not an estimate of the true total. The numbers will likely be higher by the time you click a link.
Of the over 10,000 individual killings by aircraft documented by the VDC, 2,887 took place since the start of this year, a rate of over 700 confirmed killed by air attacks per month.
Just looking at numbers killed doesn’t take account of the horrific scale of injuries. One doctor from Aleppo describes 40 to 50 injuries from one barrel bomb attack as the norm, an overwhelming escalation compared to his earlier experiences with mortar attacks that might injure 7 or 8.
Since February 22nd when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2139, which amongst other things demanded an end to air attacks on civilians, activists have logged at least 1,006 reported air attacks by Assad’s forces.
In February, UNHCR reported aid workers as saying the aerial bombing of Aleppo was causing one of the largest flows of refugees of the war, as many as 500,000. And the bombing has now continued for a further two months. The total number of refugees registered with UNHCR is now over 2.6 million.
Most recently there have been many reports of chlorine being used in barrel bombs, turning them into crude chemical weapons. While the 21 deaths in 14 attacks cited in a report by The Telegraph is a fraction of the number killed by the more usual non-CW air attacks, the chlorine bombs represent a clear breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention, signed by Syria last September, as well as being a breach of UNSC Resolution 2139 in common with the rest of the air attacks, and a crime under international humanitarian law.
To some, all this is enough to make a case for military intervention. Others doubt whether intervention can be effective, or believe it would be illegal, or think it would be impractical or prohibitively expensive, or think that it is not the responsibility of Western nations.
MORAL GROUNDS
I’ve previously argued (here and here) that the likely risk of civilians being killed in a military intervention is massively outweighed by the number of lives being taken by Assad’s air attacks. That case is even stronger now than then.
In NATO’s seven-month Libya air campaign, investigations by The New York Times, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty, counted between 40 and 115 civilians possibly killed by NATO aircraft. While it is right that NATO should be fully accountable to those it was tasked to protect, this number is a fraction of the number now being killed per month by air attacks in Syria: a minimum of over 700 every month as cited earlier.
Military action to disable Assad’s air force, more limited in aims and targets than NATO’s Libya campaign, would therefore most likely prevent very many more civilian deaths and injuries than it might cause.
When the Libya intervention is discussed, objectors point to the fact that Libya is still unstable to argue that military intervention was a failure. NATO’s mission was to protect civilians during the conflict, not establish stable government; nonetheless one can favourably compare Libya’s postwar instability with the situation in Syria. In all of 2013 there were reportedly 643 violent deaths in Libya. In Syria death tolls are now in excess of 200 daily according to the UN Secretary-General’s March report.
So much safer does Libya seem than Syria that the UNHCR has registered 17,589 Syrian refugees in Libya.
It’s also sometimes argued that war in Mali was a result of the Libya intervention, and thus demonstrates the folly of intervention in Syria. This ignores both the history of conflict in Mali, and the scale of the ongoing destabilisation in Lebanon and Iraq that is directly connected with allowing Syria’s war to rage on.
Military action against Assad’s air force would not in itself be likely to end the war, nor would it ensure a stable future for Syrians or their neighbours, but it would almost certainly prevent a big portion of the further suffering now promised to them. For those with the military means to act, there is a moral imperative to do so.
LEGAL GROUNDS
Indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas is prohibited under international humanitarian law.
The recent use of chlorine bombs violates the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a signatory.
UN Security Council Resolution 2139 on Syria “demands that all parties immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs…”
The Assad regime is therefore clearly, deliberately, continuously violating international law. But would a targeted military action to disable Assad’s air force also violate international law? Not according to UK Government legal opinion.
Minister of State Hugh Robertson reaffirmed in January that under certain circumstances the UK Government regards humanitarian intervention as legal even without a UN Security Council resolution. Those circumstances were defined in a Foreign and Commonwealth Office note circulated to NATO allies in October 1998 prior to the Kosovo intervention, as follows:
Security Council authorisation to use force for humanitarian purposes is now widely accepted (Bosnia and Somalia provided firm legal precedents). A UNSCR would give a clear legal base for NATO action, as well as being politically desirable.
But force can also be justified on the grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity without a UNSCR. The following criteria would need to be applied:
(a) that there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief;
(b) that it is objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved;
(c) that the proposed use of force is necessary and proportionate to the aim (the relief of humanitarian need) and is strictly limited in time and scope to this aim—ie it is the minimum necessary to achieve that end. It would also be necessary at the appropriate stages to assess the targets against this criterion.In a parliamentary debate on the Kosovo intervention in 1999, UK Defence Minister George Robertson declared that:
We are in no doubt that NATO is acting within international law. Our legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. Those circumstances clearly exist in Kosovo.
The use of force in such circumstances can be justified as an exceptional measure in support of purposes laid down by the UN Security Council, but without the Council's express authorisation, when that is the only means to avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.The current situation in Syria is similar in that narrowly targeted military action to stop aerial attacks would clearly be in support of the purposes of Resolution 2139, even though that resolution doesn’t expressly authorise the use of force.
PRACTICAL OPTIONS
A patrolled No-Fly Zone such as was implemented over Bosnia, and later over northern and southern Iraq, would be an expensive open-ended commitment. It would also require the kind of capability to suppress enemy air defences only held by the US, so would not be an option without active US participation.
Use of Patriot missiles in Turkey has been proposed by some, but they’re better suited to defend against missile attack and can’t be safely used against enemy aircraft if friendly aircraft are operating in the same space.
Providing anti-aircraft weapons to rebels is seen as a serious security risk in case they might come into the wrong hands and be used against civilian aircraft.
The best option in Syria seems to be limited strikes against selected targets, whether deterrent strikes against a few choice targets to try and persuade Assad to comply with Resolution 2139 or a wider campaign of strikes against Assad’s air capacity.
Not only would this cost less than a full no-fly zone, but as the duration of a limited strike action would be shorter than a patrolled no-fly zone, and as air defences wouldn’t need to be targeted to the same degree, there should also be less risk to both air crews and to civilians on the ground.
OUR RESPONSIBILITY
There are only a few states capable of mounting carefully targeted military strikes against Assad. They include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Of those, Britain, France, and the United States are the only ones with previous experience of conducting such operations, and are also the only permanent members likely to support such action given Russia and China’s history of support for the Assad regime.
The capacity to act, the privilege of permanent membership of the Security Council, the protection of veto power in the Council; all of these mean a moral, legal, and political responsibility to act falls upon the governments of Britain, France, and the United States.
Continued failure to act undermines the moral standing of the UK, France, and US. It undermines the legal standing of UN Security Council resolutions, of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and of all international humanitarian law. It undermines the political position of UNSC permanent members, and undermines the current international order. It threatens our security.
This responsibility falls on these three governments collectively and individually. If one fails to act, that does not absolve the others. Each has both the power and the responsibility to act.
Saturday, 15 March 2014
Enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 2139
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
Today marks three years since the start of the Syrian conflict, and three weeks since the passing of Resolution 2139 (Syria – Humanitarian Assistance). The resolution made several demands including the following:
(1) it strongly condemned “widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed groups…”
(2) demanded “an end to all forms of violence…”
(3) demanded “that all parties immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs…”
(4) demanded “that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, fully implement the provisions of the 2 October 2013 Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2013/15) including through facilitating the expansion of humanitarian relief operations…”
(5) called upon “all parties to immediately lift the sieges of populated areas…”
(6) demanded “that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners…”
(7) Urged “all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to take all appropriate steps to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and all humanitarian actors engaged in humanitarian relief activities…”
(8) Demanded “that all parties respect the principle of medical neutrality and facilitate free passage to all areas for medical personnel, equipment, transport and supplies…”
… and more. Read the full text here.
Since then violence has not stopped. The shelling and the bombing of civilian areas by Assad’s air force has not stopped (here, here, here). The UN and aid agencies are still being blocked from bringing relief supplies. Sieges have continued. Seemingly deliberate attacks on hospitals by Assad’s forces have continued.
Resolution 2139 concludes by requesting “the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution by all parties in Syria… in 30 days of its adoption and every 30 days thereafter, and upon receipt of the Secretary-General’s report, expresses its intent to take further steps in the case of non-compliance with this resolution.”
The Secretary-General’s first report will fall due Monday week. As Assad’s non-compliance is already clear, Security Council members should now be making ready measures to enforce the resolution. A particular responsibility will rest on the Permanent Five members. If as in the past Russia and China refuse to co-operate with enforcement measures, that responsibility will rest with France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
There are three reasons why UNSC 2139 must be enforced. The first is humanitarian. On past evidence, carefully targeted military action against Assad, particularly against his air force, would likely save many more lives than it would put at risk.
The second is to preserve and build the legitimacy of international humanitarian law, international law in general, and the UN Security Council in particular. The repeated use by UNSC Permanent Members veto power to shield perpetrators of mass murder undermines the legitimacy of the institution. Human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty have called for reform of the use of the veto power, but the lack of such reform doesn’t absolve individual members from their responsibility to uphold the express will of the UNSC, and their responsibility to uphold international humanitarian law in general, particularly in cases where the nature of the breach can only be effectively dealt with by powerful and technologically sophisticated military forces.
The third reason why UNSC 2139 must be enforced is because Syria’s war presents an increasing threat to citizens of other countries, including citizens of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is in all of our interests to reduce the violence and to break the spell of impunity currently granted to the perpetrators.
Earlier:
Syria (still) needs a No-Fly Zone
Imposing an NFZ carries risks, but the risks are outweighed by the cost of allowing Assad’s air force to continue killing. This article compares the known cost in civilian lives of Libya’s No-Fly Zone with the known scale of killing by aircraft in Syria.
READ MORE
No-Fly Zone options
Reasons for favouring a limited strike option
READ MORE
NFZ reading list
Links to research, journalism, and advocacy.
READ MORE
Today marks three years since the start of the Syrian conflict, and three weeks since the passing of Resolution 2139 (Syria – Humanitarian Assistance). The resolution made several demands including the following:
(1) it strongly condemned “widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed groups…”
(2) demanded “an end to all forms of violence…”
(3) demanded “that all parties immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs…”
(4) demanded “that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, fully implement the provisions of the 2 October 2013 Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2013/15) including through facilitating the expansion of humanitarian relief operations…”
(5) called upon “all parties to immediately lift the sieges of populated areas…”
(6) demanded “that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners…”
(7) Urged “all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to take all appropriate steps to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and all humanitarian actors engaged in humanitarian relief activities…”
(8) Demanded “that all parties respect the principle of medical neutrality and facilitate free passage to all areas for medical personnel, equipment, transport and supplies…”
… and more. Read the full text here.
Since then violence has not stopped. The shelling and the bombing of civilian areas by Assad’s air force has not stopped (here, here, here). The UN and aid agencies are still being blocked from bringing relief supplies. Sieges have continued. Seemingly deliberate attacks on hospitals by Assad’s forces have continued.
Resolution 2139 concludes by requesting “the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution by all parties in Syria… in 30 days of its adoption and every 30 days thereafter, and upon receipt of the Secretary-General’s report, expresses its intent to take further steps in the case of non-compliance with this resolution.”
The Secretary-General’s first report will fall due Monday week. As Assad’s non-compliance is already clear, Security Council members should now be making ready measures to enforce the resolution. A particular responsibility will rest on the Permanent Five members. If as in the past Russia and China refuse to co-operate with enforcement measures, that responsibility will rest with France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
There are three reasons why UNSC 2139 must be enforced. The first is humanitarian. On past evidence, carefully targeted military action against Assad, particularly against his air force, would likely save many more lives than it would put at risk.
The second is to preserve and build the legitimacy of international humanitarian law, international law in general, and the UN Security Council in particular. The repeated use by UNSC Permanent Members veto power to shield perpetrators of mass murder undermines the legitimacy of the institution. Human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty have called for reform of the use of the veto power, but the lack of such reform doesn’t absolve individual members from their responsibility to uphold the express will of the UNSC, and their responsibility to uphold international humanitarian law in general, particularly in cases where the nature of the breach can only be effectively dealt with by powerful and technologically sophisticated military forces.
The third reason why UNSC 2139 must be enforced is because Syria’s war presents an increasing threat to citizens of other countries, including citizens of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is in all of our interests to reduce the violence and to break the spell of impunity currently granted to the perpetrators.
Earlier:
Syria (still) needs a No-Fly Zone
Imposing an NFZ carries risks, but the risks are outweighed by the cost of allowing Assad’s air force to continue killing. This article compares the known cost in civilian lives of Libya’s No-Fly Zone with the known scale of killing by aircraft in Syria.
READ MORE
No-Fly Zone options
Reasons for favouring a limited strike option
READ MORE
NFZ reading list
Links to research, journalism, and advocacy.
READ MORE
Saturday, 25 January 2014
No-Fly Zone options: Reasons for favouring a limited strike option
Cross-posted from NFZSyria.org.
Without a clear sense of how long the Syrian war might go on, and without clarity as to how Assad might be defeated or what kind of government might succeed him, there are strong reasons for caution about intervention. With America and Britain still militarily engaged in Afghanistan, and with no way of knowing what other threats might emerge elsewhere in the world before Syria’s war reaches an end, there are strong reasons for their reluctance to commit limited military resources to a no-fly zone.
Still the moral reality remains: a no-fly zone could save many lives. It’s likely over 10,000 of those killed in Syria have been victims of air attacks. So what options are available?
Without a clear sense of how long the Syrian war might go on, and without clarity as to how Assad might be defeated or what kind of government might succeed him, there are strong reasons for caution about intervention. With America and Britain still militarily engaged in Afghanistan, and with no way of knowing what other threats might emerge elsewhere in the world before Syria’s war reaches an end, there are strong reasons for their reluctance to commit limited military resources to a no-fly zone.
Still the moral reality remains: a no-fly zone could save many lives. It’s likely over 10,000 of those killed in Syria have been victims of air attacks. So what options are available?
Thursday, 23 January 2014
NFZ reading list
• Syria casualty reports
• What is a No-Fly Zone?
• International law
• Opinion and advocacy
• News reports
Cross posted from NFZSyria.org.
Read more below the fold.
• What is a No-Fly Zone?
• International law
• Opinion and advocacy
• News reports
Cross posted from NFZSyria.org.
Read more below the fold.
Tuesday, 7 January 2014
“They can’t aim very well”
Last June, President Obama argued against a No–Fly Zone in the following terms:
That same figure of 90% of opposition casualties not being caused by air strikes was also at the centre of Mark Thompson’s article of the same date for Time. It was attributed to Army General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Violations Documentations Centre in Syria lists 5,160 individuals killed specifically by aircraft up to June 17th 2013, the date of those articles.
Killed by an air force that “isn’t particularly good.”
Today the VDC’s total number of records of men, women, and children, killed by Assad’s air force has reached 7,510 individuals. By the time you click on this link it may be more. This is a minimum count of confirmed killings by aircraft. The actual number of people is likely over 10,000. Of whom at least 2,000 are children.
Killed by an air force that “can’t aim very well.”
Syria still needs a No-Fly Zone.
Responding to calls to shut down Syria’s combat aircraft with American air power, Obama said “the fact of the matter is for example, 90 percent of the deaths that have taken place haven’t been because of air strikes by the Syrian air force.”
“Syrian Air Force isn’t particularly good. They can’t aim very well,” he said, adding that most of the action was taking place “on the ground.”That’s from a June 17th 2013 report by Dan De Luce of AFP, here and here.
That same figure of 90% of opposition casualties not being caused by air strikes was also at the centre of Mark Thompson’s article of the same date for Time. It was attributed to Army General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Violations Documentations Centre in Syria lists 5,160 individuals killed specifically by aircraft up to June 17th 2013, the date of those articles.
Killed by an air force that “isn’t particularly good.”
Today the VDC’s total number of records of men, women, and children, killed by Assad’s air force has reached 7,510 individuals. By the time you click on this link it may be more. This is a minimum count of confirmed killings by aircraft. The actual number of people is likely over 10,000. Of whom at least 2,000 are children.
Killed by an air force that “can’t aim very well.”
Syria still needs a No-Fly Zone.
Thursday, 2 January 2014
‘Happy ever after’ is not a realistic standard for any policy
My recent post, Syria (still) needs a No-Fly Zone, has been republished at Left Foot Forward where it has attracted a few comments, which is gratifying even if they were all in disagreement with the argument. Below is a very slightly edited version of my responses to comments so far.
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